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ABSTRACT
The paper generalizes the Taylor principle---the proposition that central banks can stabilize the
macroeconomy by raising their interest rate instrument more than one-for-one in response to higher
inflation---to an environment in which reaction coefficients in the monetary policy rule evolve
according to a Markov process. We derive a long-run Taylor principle that delivers unique bounded
equilibria in two standard models. Policy can satisfy the Taylor principle in the long run, even while
deviating from it substantially for brief periods or modestly for prolonged periods. Macroeconomic
volatility can be higher in periods when the Taylor principle is not satisfied, not because of
indeterminacy, but because monetary policy amplifies the impacts of fundamental shocks. Regime
change alters the qualitative and quantitative predictions of a conventional new Keynesian model,
yielding fresh interpretations of existing empirical work.
Troy Davig
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1. Introduction
Monetary policy making is complex. Central bankers examine a vast array of data,
hear from a variety of advisors, use suites of models to interpret the data, and apply
judgment to adjust the predictions of models. This process produces a monetary
policy rule that is a complicated, probably non-linear, function of a large set of
information about the state of the economy.
For both descriptive and prescriptive reasons, macroeconomists seek simple char-
acterizations of policy. Perhaps the most successful simpliﬁcation is due to Taylor
(1993). He ﬁnds that a very simple rule does a good job of describing Federal Reserve
interest-rate decisions, particularly since 1982. Taylor’s rule is
it =¯ i + α(πt − π
∗)+γxt + εt, (1)
where it is the central bank’s policy interest rate, ¯ i is the long-run policy rate, πt
is inﬂation, π∗ is the central bank’s inﬂation target, x is output, and ε is a random
variable. With settings of α =1 .5a n dγ = .5o r1 , Taylor (1999a) uses this equation
to interpret Federal Reserve behavior over several eras since 1960.
The Taylor principle—the proposition that central banks can stabilize the macroe-
conomy by adjusting their interest rate instrument more than one-for-one with inﬂa-
tion (setting α>1)—and the Taylor rule that embodies it have proven to be powerful
devices to simplify the modeling of policy behavior. In many monetary models, the
Taylor principle is necessary and suﬃcient for the existence of a determinate rational
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expectations equilibrium. Failure of monetary policy to satisfy the principle can pro-
duce undesirable outcomes in two ways. First, the eﬀects of fundamental shocks are
ampliﬁed and can cause ﬂuctuations in output and inﬂation that are arbitrarily large.
Second, there exist a multiplicity of bounded equilibria in which output and inﬂation
respond to non-fundamental—sunspot—disturbances. If the objective of a central
bank is to stabilize output and inﬂation, these outcomes are clearly undesirable. Tay-
lor (1999a) and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), among others, have argued that
failure of Federal Reserve policy to satisfy the Taylor principle may have been the
source of greater macroeconomic instability in the United States in the 1960s and
1970s.
Taylor-inspired rules have been found to perform well in a class of models that is
now in heavy use in policy research [Bryant, Hooper, and Mann (1993), Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997), Taylor (1999b), Faust, Orphanides, and Reifschneider (2005),
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006)]. Some policy institutions publish the policy interest
rate paths produced by simple rules, treating the implied policy prescriptions as
useful benchmarks for policy evaluation [Bank for International Settlements (1998),
Sveriges Riksbank (2001, 2002), Norges Bank (2005), Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis (2005)]. In large part because it is a gross simpliﬁcation of reality, the Taylor
rule has been extraordinarily useful.
Gross simpliﬁcation is both a strength and a weakness of a constant-parameter rule
like (1). Because the rule compresses and reduces information about actual policy
behavior, it can mask important aspects of that behavior. There are clearly states
of the economy in which policy settings of the nominal interest rate deviate from
the rule in substantial and serially correlated ways. This confronts researchers with
a substantive modeling choice: it matters whether these deviations are shuﬄed into
the ε’s or modeled as time-varying feedback coeﬃcients, αt and γt. Positing that pol-
icy rules mapping endogenous variables into policy choices evolve according to some
probability distribution can fundamentally change dynamics, including conditions
that ensure a unique equilibrium, and substantially expand the set of determinate
rational expectations equilibria supported by conventional monetary models.
This paper generalizes Taylor’s rule and principle by allowing the parameters of
that rule to vary stochastically over time.1 It examines how such time variation aﬀects
1In contrast to our approach, some papers consider changes in processes governing exogenous pol-
icy variables [Dotsey (1990), Kaminsky (1993), Ruge-Murcia (1995), Andolfatto and Gomme (2003),
Davig (2003, 2004), and Leeper and Zha (2003)]. Each of these considers changes in exogenous pro-
cesses for policy instruments like a tax rate, money growth rate, or government expenditures. Other
papers model policy switching as changes in endogenous policy functions [Davig, Leeper, and Chung
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the nature of equilibriumin popular models of monetary policy. As a ﬁrst step, in this
paper we model parameters as evolving exogenously according to a Markov chain.2
Two parts comprise the paper. We use a simple dynamic Fisherian model in the
ﬁrst part to derive interpretable analytical restrictions on monetary policy behavior
that are required for the existence of a determinate equilibrium; that model yields
intuitive solutions that reveal how regime change alters the nature of equilibrium. In
the second, more substantive part, we use a conventional new Keynesian model to
examine the practical consequences of regime change for monetary policy.
The Fisherian model of inﬂation illustrates the following theoretical points:
• A unique bounded equilibrium does not require the Taylor principle to hold in
every period. Determinacy does require that monetary policy obey a long-run
Taylor principle, which permits departures from the Taylor principle that are
substantial (but brief) or modest (and prolonged).
• If there are two possible policy rules—one that aggressively reacts to inﬂa-
tion (“more active”) and one that reacts less aggressively (“less active” or
“passive”)—expectations that future policy might be less active can strongly
aﬀect the equilibrium under the more-active rule, and vice versa.
These theoretical themes extend to a conventional model of inﬂation and out-
put determination which has become a workhorse for empirical and theoretical work
on monetary policy. The long-run Taylor principle for the new Keynesian model
dramatically expands the region of determinacy relative to the constant-parameter
setup. On-going regime change creates expectations formation eﬀects that arise from
the possibility that future regimes may diﬀer from the prevailing regime. Those ef-
fects can change the responses of inﬂation and output to exogenous disturbances
in quantitatively important ways. Regimes that fail to satisfy the Taylor principle
can amplify the eﬀects of fundamental exogenous shocks, which increases volatility
without resorting to indeterminacy and non-fundamental sources of disturbances.
Having established these theoretical results, we use the new Keynesian model to
show that regime change can be important in practice. The illustrations are of interest
because the model forms the core of the large class of models being ﬁt to data by
academic and central-bank researchers.
3 Illustrations focus on the following questions:
• A number of authors have argued that the U.S. inﬂation of the 1970s was
due to the Federal Reserve’s failure to obey the Taylor principle and the
resulting indeterminacy of equilibrium. Does this inference hold up when
2Davig and Leeper (2006a) examine the consequences of making regime change endogenous.
3For example, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Smets and
Wouters (2003, 2005), Del Negro and Schorfheide (2004, 2006), Adolfson, Laseen, Linde, and Villani
(2005), Harrison, Nikolov, Quinn, Ramsey, Scott, and Thomas (2005).GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 4
agents’ expectations embed the possibility of regime change? If a central
bank is an aggressive inﬂation ﬁghter today, can the perception that it might
revert to 1970s-style accommodative policies make it diﬃcult to stabilize the
economy now?
• Over the past 20-plus years, when the Fed arguably has aggressively sought
to reduce and stabilize inﬂation, there are apparent systematic departures
from the Taylor principle due to worries about ﬁnancial instability or con-
cerns about weak real economic activity. What are the consequences of these
departures?
• Researchers typically divide data into regime-speciﬁc periods to interpret time
series as emerging from distinct ﬁxed-regime models. What are the conse-
quences of this practice?
The paper oﬀers some answers, along with some novel interpretations of existing
empirical ﬁndings. A possible switch from an active to an accommodating monetary
policy regime should concern a central bank for two reasons. First, if the accommo-
dating regime is suﬃciently passive or suﬃciently persistent, the equilibrium can be
indeterminate. Second, even in a determinate equilibrium, expectations of a move to
a dovish regime can raise aggregate volatility, even if current policy is aggressively
hawkish. A realized switch to passive policy dramatically increases inﬂation volatility
even when self-fulﬁlling expectations are ruled out. Brief departures from the Tay-
lor principle, such as occur during ﬁnancial crises or business-cycle downturns, are
less likely to induce indeterminacy, but can nonetheless create expectations forma-
tion eﬀects with quantitatively important impacts on economic performance. Eﬀorts
to use theoretical models with ﬁxed policy rules to interpret time series data gener-
ated by recurring regime switching are fraught with pitfalls, easily yielding inaccurate
inferences.
1.1. The Relevance of Recurring Regime Change. Recurring regime change
is not the norm in theoretical models of monetary policy, yet a major branch of
applied work ﬁnds evidence of time variation in monetary policy in the UnitedStates.4
The theoretical norm, which follows Lucas (1976) in treating policy shifts as once-
and-for-all rather than as an on-going process, is logically inconsistent, as Cooley,
LeRoy, and Raymon (1982, 1984) point out. Once-and-for-all shifts, by deﬁnition, are
unanticipated, yet once the shift occurs, agents are assumed to believe the new regime
is permanent and alternative regimes are impossible. But if regime has changed, then
regime can change; knowing this, private agents will ascribe a probability distribution
to regimes. Expectations formation and, therefore, the resulting equilibria will reﬂect
4For example, Judd and Trehan (1995), Taylor (1999a), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Kim
and Nelson (2004), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Rabanal (2004), Favero and Monacelli (2005),
Boivin and Giannoni (2003), Boivin (2005), Cogley and Sargent (2005), Davig and Leeper (2006b),
and Sims and Zha (2006).GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 5
agents’ beliefs that regime change is possible. This paper is a step toward bringing
theory in line with evidence.
The paper presumes that policy regimes recur and treats, as a special case, regimes
that are permanent. In the United States, monetary policy regimes over the post-
World War II period have been shaped largelyby particular Federal Reserve chairmen,
rather than by institutional or legislative changes that altered the Fed’s mandate.
Despite this fact, some observers believe that since Alan Greenspan’s appointment
as Fed chairman in 1987—and possibly even before—U.S. monetary policy has been
in an absorbing state. At least this is the implicit assumption in most studies of
monetary policy behavior.
We are not persuaded. Appointments of central bank governors are determined by
the conﬂuence of economic and political conditions, which ﬂuctuate over time, rather
than by any legislated rules. As long as the personalities and preferences of those
appointees dictate the policies that central banks follow, ﬂuctuating regimes is a more
natural assumption than is permanent regime. Certainly, regime change is a viable
working hypothesis.
2. A Fisherian Model of Inflation Determination
An especially simple model of inﬂation determination emerges from combining a
Fisher relation with a monetary policy rule that makes the nominal interest rate
respond to inﬂation. The setup is rich enough to highlight general features that arise
in a rational expectations environment with regime change in monetary policy, but
simple enough to admit analytical solutions that make transparent the mechanisms
at work.
Throughout the paper we deﬁne determinacy of equilibrium to be the existence of a
unique bounded equilibrium. We also place ﬁscal policy in the background, assuming
that lump-sum taxes and transfers adjust passively to ensure ﬁscal solvency.
This section describes a two-step procedure applicable to purely forward-looking
rational expectations models with regime-switching. First, we derive interpretable
analytical conditions on the model parameters that ensure a determinate equilibrium.
Next, we derive the equilibrium using the method of undetermined coeﬃcients to
obtain solutions as functions of the minimum set of state variables.
2.1. The Setup. Consider a nominal bond that costs $1 at date t and pays oﬀ
$(1 + it)a td a t et +1 . The asset-pricing equation for this bond can be written in
log-linearized form as
it = Etπt+1 + rt, (2)GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 6
where rt is the equilibrium (ex-ante) real interest rate at t. For simplicity, the real
interest rate is exogenous and evolves according to
rt = ρrt−1 + υt, (3)
with |ρ| < 1a n dυ a zero-mean, i.i.d. random variable with bounded support [υ,υ],
so that ﬂuctuations in rt are bounded.
Monetary policy follows a simpliﬁed Taylor rule, adjusting the nominal interest rate
in response to inﬂation, where the reaction to inﬂation evolves stochastically between
regimes
it = α(st)πt, (4)
where st is the realized policy regime, which takes realized values of 1 or 2. Two
regimes are suﬃcient for our purposes, though the methods employed immediately
generalize to many regimes. Regime follows a Markov chain with transition proba-
bilities pij = P[st = j |st−1 = i], where i,j =1 ,2. We assume
α(st)=
 
α1 for st =1
α2 for st =2 (5)
and that the random variables s and υ are independent.
A monetary policy regime is a distinct realization of the random variable st and a
monetary policy process consists of all possible αi’s and the transition probabilities
of the Markov chain, (α1,α 2,p 11,p 22). In this model, monetary policy is active in
regime i if αi > 1a n dpassive if αi < 1, following the terminology of Leeper (1991).
If α1 >α 2, then the monetary policy process becomes more active if α1,α 2, or p11
increase or p22 decreases.
Substituting (4) into (2), the system reduces to the single state-dependent equation
α(st)πt = Etπt+1 + rt. (6)
If only a single, ﬁxed regime were possible, then αi = α and the expected path
of policy depends on the constant α. A unique bounded equilibrium requires active





Stronger responses of policy to inﬂation (larger values of α) reduce the variability of
inﬂation. The Taylor principle says that α>1 is necessary and suﬃcient for a unique
bounded equilibrium.
When α<1 and regime is ﬁxed, the equilibrium is not unique and a large mul-
tiplicity of solutions exist, including stationary sunspot equilibria, in which πt is a
function of (πt−1,r t) and possibly a sunspot shock.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 7
When regime can change, (6) is a system whose number of equations matches the
number of possible regimes. To make this explicit, the conditional expectation in (6)
is Etπt+1 = E[πt+1|Ωt], with Ωt = {st,s t−1,...,r t,r t−1,...}.5 st follows a ﬁnite two-
state Markov chain, so is bounded by construction, and rt follows a bounded process.
It is convenient to deﬁne a smaller information set which excludes the current regime,
Ω
−s
t = {st−1,...,r t,r t−1,...},s oΩ t =Ω
−s
t ∪{ st}. Integrating over possible future
regimes, we can write
Etπt+1 = E[πt+1
 











where we have introduced the state-contingent notation, πit = πt(st = i,rt), for
i =1 ,2, so πit is the solution to (6) when st = i. Deﬁne zt =( st,r t) to be the minimum
state vector at date t. We shall prove that the minimumstate vector solution, πt (zt)=
(π1t,π 2t)
  , is the unique bounded solution to (6).









































and write (6) as
πt = MEtπt+1 + α
−1rt, (11)
where πt =( π1t,π 2t)
  is now a vector and α−1 denotes the matrix that premultiplies
the transition probabilities in (10).
2.2. The Long-Run Taylor Principle. This section derives necessary and suﬃ-
cient conditions for the existence of a unique bounded solution to (11), assuming
bounded ﬂuctuations in the exogenous disturbances. Our deﬁnition of determinacy
is consistent with the standard one used in the Taylor-rule literature in the absence
of regime switching.
We use the standard deﬁnition for two reasons. First, it corresponds to existence of
a locally unique solution. Local uniqueness allows us to analyze how small perturba-
tions to the model impact the equilibrium, as Woodford (2003, Appendix A.3) shows.
Second, this paper follows most of the literature in studying log-linear approximations
5This assumes that current regime enters the agent’s information set, which contrasts with the
usual econometric treatment of regime as an unobserved state variable [Hamilton (1989) or Kim and
Nelson (1999)]. Some theoretical work treats agents as having to infer the current regime [Andolfatto
and Gomme (2003), Leeper and Zha (2003), and Davig (2004)]. Concentrating all uncertainty about
policy on future regimes makes clearer how expectations formation, as opposed to inference problems,
aﬀects the regime-switching equilibrium.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 8
to underlying nonlinear dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models.6 Bounded
solutions to the linear systems are approximate local solutions to the full nonlinear
models when the exogenous shocks are small enough.






















This leads to one of the main propositions of the paper.
Proposition 1. When αi > 0,f o ri =1 ,2, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
determinacy of equilibrium, deﬁned as the existence of a unique bounded solution for
{πt} in (11), is that all the eigenvalues of M l i ei n s i d et h eu n i tc i r c l e .
The proof, which appears in appendix A, shows that when all the eigenvalues of M
lie inside the unit circle, then all bounded solutions must coincide with the minimum
state variable solution, which is a function only of (st,r t). In the case where one of
the eigenvalues does not lie inside the unit circle, the proof displays a continuum of
bounded solutions, including stationary sunspot equilibria. Hence, even within the
standard deﬁnition of determinacy of equilibrium, the monetary policy process can
generate a large multiplicity of solutions that are a function of an expanded state
vector.7
Although one could use proposition 1 and work directly with the eigenvalues to
characterize the class of policy processes consistent with a determinate equilibrium,
it is more convenient and economically intuitive to analyze an equivalent set of con-
ditions. It turns out that requiring both eigenvalues to lie inside the unit circle is
equivalent to requiring that policy be active in at least one regime—αi > 1f o rs o m e
i—and that the policy process satisﬁes a long-run Taylor principle. This is the second
proposition of the paper, which appendix A also proves.
6Appendices in Davig, Leeper, and Chung (2004) display a model with regime switching in mon-
etary and ﬁscal policy rules for which conventional linearization methods will fail to uncover even
locally accurate stability conditions for the underlying full nonlinear model. The extent to which
solutions to linear systems are approximate local solutions to the nonlinear switching models remains
an area for future research.
7Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2006) employ an alternative deﬁnition of determinacy, requiring
stationary—mean-square stable—solutions, to generate multiple solutions. As appendix A points
out, this deﬁnition admits solutions in which inﬂation can exceed any ﬁnite bound with positive
probability, a result that is ruled out by the standard deﬁnition in linear models. Of course, both
with and without regime switching, there are many explosive solutions to (11).GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 9
Proposition 2. Given αi >p ii for i =1 ,2, the following statements are equivalent:
(A) All the eigenvalues of M lie inside the unit circle.
(B) αi > 1, for some i =1 ,2, and the long-run Taylor principle (LRTP)
(1 − α2)p11 +( 1− α1)p22 + α1α2 > 1 (14)
is satisﬁed.
The premise of proposition 2—that αi >p ii for all i—is unfamiliar and requires
some discussion. If regime were ﬁxed, the premise amounts to satisfying the Taylor
principle in both regimes. But when regime can change, it is a much weaker require-
ment. The LRTP deﬁnes a hyperbola in (α1,α 2)-space with asymptotes α1 = p11 and
α2 = p22. The premise restricts the α’s to the space containing the economically in-
teresting portion of the hyperbola, in which monetary policy seeks to stabilize, rather
than destablize, the economy.
Two eigenvalues inside the unit circle imply two linear restrictions that uniquely
determine the regime-dependent expectations of inﬂation in (9). This is quite diﬀer-
ent from ﬁxed regimes because with regime switching, when there is a determinate
equilibrium, the solutions always come from “solving forward,” even in regimes where
monetary policy behavior is passive (αi < 1). This delivers solutions that are quali-
tatively diﬀerent from those obtained with ﬁxed regimes.
A range of monetary policy behavior is consistent with the LRTP: monetary policy
can be mildly passive most of the time or very passive some of the time. To see
this, suppose that regime 1 is active and regime 2 is passive and consider the limiting
case that arises as α1 becomes arbitrarily large. Driving α1 →∞in the LRTP, (14),
implies that α2 >p 22 is the lower bound for α2 in a determinate equilibrium. For α1
suﬃciently large, a unique equilibrium can have α2 arbitrarily close to 0 (a pegged
nominal interest rate), so long as the regime in which this passive policy is realized
is suﬃciently short-lived (p22 → 0). When regime 1 is an absorbing state (p11 =1 ) ,
the eigenvalues are α1 and α2/p22. A unique equilibrium requires that α1 > 1a n d
α2 >p 22.8 The general determinacy principle is that an active regime that is either
very aggressive (α1 →∞ ) or very persistent (p11 = 1) imposes the weakest condition
on behavior in the passive regime.
Alternatively, the passive regime can be extremely persistent (p22 → 1), so long as
α2 is suﬃciently close to, but still less than, 1. In this case, if the active regime has
short duration, it is possible for the ergodic probability of the passive regime to be
close to 1 (but less than 1), yet still deliver a determinate equilibrium.
8When p11 = 1, the system is recursive, so the diﬀerence equation for inﬂation in state 1 is
independent of state 2 and yields the usual ﬁxed-regime solution for inﬂation. The second equation
reduces to a diﬀerence equation in inﬂation in state 2 and a unique bounded solution to that equation
requires α2 >p 22.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 10
An interesting special case arises when both regimes are reﬂecting states. With
p11 = p22 =0 , the eigenvalues reduce to λk = ±1/
√
α1α2. When the α’s are both
positive and regime 1 is active, the lower bound on the passive policy (α2)f o ra
unique equilibrium is α2 > 1/α1. In this case, the economy spends equal amounts of
time in the two regimes, but it changes regime every period with probability 1. This
inequality reinforces the general principle that the more aggressive monetary policy
is in active regimes, the more passive it can be in other regimes and still deliver
determinacy.
Figure 1 uses the expressions for the eigenvalues in (12) and (13) to plot combi-
nations of the policy-rule coeﬃcients, α1 and α2, that deliver determinate equilibria
for given transition probabilities. Light-shaded areas mark regions of the parame-
ter space that imply the ﬁxed-regime equilibrium is determinate. When regime can
change, those regions expand to include the dark-shaded areas. The top two panels
show that as the mean duration, given by 1/(1 − pii), of each regime declines, the
determinacy region expands. Asymmetric mean duration expands the determinacy
region in favor of the parameter drawn from the more transient regime (α2 in the
southwest panel of the ﬁgure). As the mean durations of both regimes approach 1
period, the determinacy region expands dramatically along both the α1 and α2 di-
mensions, as the southeast panel shows. The ﬁgure and the LRTP make clear the
hyperbolic relationship betweeen α1 and α2, for given (p11,p 22).
2.3. Solutions. Having delineated the class of monetary policy processes that deliver
a determinate equilibrium, we now ﬁnd the minimum state variable (MSV) solution
using the method of undetermined coeﬃcients. We posit regime-dependent linear
solutions of the form
πit = a(st = i)rt, (15)
for i =1 ,2, where
a(st = i)=
 
a1 for st =1
a2 for st =2 . (16)
Expected inﬂation one step ahead depends on this period’s realizations of regime
and real interest rate, as well as on next period’s expected solution
Etπt+1 = E[πt+1|st,r t]
= ρrtE[a(st+1)|st,r t], (17)
where we have used the independence of the random variables r and s.T h ep o s i t e d
solutions, together with (17), imply the following regime-dependent expectations
E[πt+1 |st =1 ,r t]=[ p11a1 +( 1− p11)a2]ρrt, (18)
E[πt+1 |st =2 ,r t]=[ ( 1− p22)a1 + p22a2]ρrt. (19)GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 11
Substituting (18) and (19) into (6) for each st =1 ,2, we obtain a linear system in










α1 − ρp11 −ρ(1 − p11)
































w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ef a c t st h a tp12 =1−p11 and p21 =1−p22, and we have deﬁned






,i =1 ,2. (24)
The limiting arguments applied to (14), together with the bounded real interest rate
process, imply that in a determinate equilibrium, αi >ρ p ii, so aF
i ≥ 0.a F
i is strictly
increasing in ρ, strictly decreasing in αi, and strictly increasing in pii. It is straight-
forward to show that the volatility of inﬂation is smaller in the regime where policy
is more active; that is, a1 <a 2 if α1 >α 2.
The a1 and a2 coeﬃcients have the intuitive properties that they are strictly de-
creasing in both α1 and α2 and strictly increasing in ρ. More-active monetary policy
raises the α’s and decreases the inﬂation impacts of real interest rate shocks. Greater
persistence in real interest rates ampliﬁes the magnitude and therefore the impact
of real-rate shocks on inﬂation. If α1 >α 2, then as p11 rises (holding p22 ﬁxed), the
persistence of the more-active regime and the fraction of time the economy spends in
the more-active regime both rise. This reduces the reaction of inﬂation to real-rate
disturbances in both regimes. Of course, if α1 >α 2 and p22 rises (holding p11 ﬁxed),
then both a1 and a2 rise.
When the real interest rate shock is serially uncorrelated (ρ = 0), the solutions
collapse to their “ﬁxed-regime” counterparts, a1 =1 /α1 and a2 =1 /α2.B u t t h e r e
is an important diﬀerence. Determinacy of the ﬁxed regime requires αi > 1a l li,s o
monetary policy always dampens the impacts of shocks on inﬂation. With regime
switching, when α1 > 1a n dp22 <α 2 < 1, there can be a determinate equilibrium in
which monetary policy in regime 2 ampliﬁes the eﬀects of shocks.
9When regime is ﬁxed at i, pii =1 ,p jj =0 ,i  = j,i,j =1 ,2 and the coeﬃcients reduce to
aF
i =1 /(αi − ρ).GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 12
In general, all policy parameters enter the solution. Expectations of policy be-
havior in regime 2 aﬀects the equilibrium in regime 1 and vice versa. Let D =
1 − ρ2p12aF
2 p21aF
1 denote the denominator common to (22) and (23). D ∈ (0,1] and
reaches its upper bound whenever regimes are absorbing states (p12 =0o rp21 =0 ) .
Values of D less than 1 scale up the coeﬃcients relative to their “ﬁxed-regime” coun-
terparts. D achieves its minimum when regimes are reﬂecting states (p12 = p21 =1 ) .
In that case, D =1− 1/α1α2, raising the variability of inﬂation by its maximum
amount (given values for α1 and α2).
The numerators in the solutions report the two distinct eﬀects that news about
future real interest rates has on current inﬂation. Suppose the economy is in regime
1 and a higher real interest rate is realized. One eﬀect is direct and raises inﬂation
by an amount inversely related to α1, just as it would if regime were ﬁxed. A second
eﬀect works through expected inﬂation, E[πt+1|st =1 ,r t], which is the function given
by (18), (p11a1 + p12a2)ρrt. The term p12aF
2 in (22) arises from the expectation that
regime can change, with p12 the probability of changing from regime 1 to regime 2.
The size of this eﬀect is also inversely related to α1 through the coeﬃcient aF
1 . Both
of these eﬀects are tempered when the current policy regime is active (α1 > 1) or
ampliﬁed when current policy is passive (α1 < 1).
Impacts that arise from expectations of possible future regimes are called expec-
tations formation eﬀects, as in Leeper and Zha (2003). These eﬀects are present
whenever agents’ rational expectations of future regime change induce them to alter
their expectations functions. Expectations formation eﬀects are the diﬀerence be-
tween the impact of a shock when regime can change and the impact when regime is
ﬁxed forever.
The strength of expectations formation eﬀects ﬂowing from regime 2 to regime
1 depends on the probability of transitioning from regime 1 to regime 2, p12, and
on the policy behavior in and the persistence of regime 2, which are determined by
α2 and p22. Expectations formation eﬀects in regime 1 can be large if p12 is large,
p22 is large, or α2 is small. The only way to eliminate these eﬀects is for regime 1
to be an absorbing state. In that case, p11 = 1 and the solution in that regime is
πt =[ 1 /(α1 − ρ)]rt, exactly the ﬁxed-regime rule.
3. A Model of Inflation and Output Determination
This and the next sections report the implications of a regime-switching monetary
policy process for determinacy and equilibrium dynamics in a model of inﬂation and
output. We use a bare-bones model from the class of models with sticky prices
that use Calvo’s (1983) price-adjustment mechanism. Ours is a textbook version,
as in Walsh (2003) and Woodford (2003), but the general insights extend to the
variants being ﬁt to data. There are several reasons to examine regime change inGENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 13
a more complex model: it brings the analysis closer to models now being used to
confront data, compute optimal policy, and conduct actual policy analysis at central
banks; the model contains an explicit transmission mechanism for monetary policy—
an endogenous real interest rate—which tempers some of the expectations formation
eﬀects found in the Fisherian model; it allows us to track how the possibility of regime
change inﬂuences the dynamic impacts of aggregate demand and aggregate supply
shocks on inﬂation and output.
3.1. The Model. The linearized equations describing private sector behavior are the
consumption-Euler equation and aggregate supply relations




πt = βEtπt+1 + κxt + u
S
t , (26)
where xt is the output gap, uD
t is an aggregate demand shock, and uS
t is an aggre-
gate supply shock. σ−1 represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, κ is a
function of how frequently price adjustments occur, as in Calvo (1983), and of β, the
discount factor. The slope of the supply curve is determined by κ =( 1 −ω)(1−βω)/ω,
where 1 − ω is the randomly selected fraction of ﬁrms that adjust prices. Prices are
more ﬂexible as ω → 0, which makes κ →∞ . As a baseline, we set σ =1 ,β = .99
and ω = .67, so κ = .17. We interpret a model period as one quarter in calendar
time.















where |ρD| < 1, |ρS| < 1, εD
t and εS
t are mean zero random variables with bounded
supports, and E[εD
t εS
s] = 0 for all t and s.I fs h o c k sa r ei.i.d., then regime switching is
irrelevant to the dynamics, but not to the determinacy properties of the equilibrium.
As before, monetary policy is the source of regime switching and we assume a
Taylor rule that sets the nominal interest rate according to
it = α(st)πt + γ(st)xt, (29)
where st evolves according to a Markov chain with transition matrix whose typical
element is pij =P r [ st = j|st−1 = i]f o ri,j =1 ,2. st is independent of uD
t and uS
t . As
before, α(st)e q u a l sα1 or α2 and γ(st)e q u a l sγ1 or γ2. We assume the steady state
does not change across regimes.
10The model is linearized around a steady state inﬂation rate of 0 to keep the analysis simple.
In future work it is worthwhile to explore the implications of allowing the inﬂation target to ﬂuc-
tuate stochastically [Cogley and Sbordone (2005), Ireland (2006)] and to allow varying degrees of
indexation to inﬂation [Ascari and Ropele (2005)].GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 14
3.2. Fixed-Regime Equilibrium. Intuition from the ﬁxed-regime equilibrium car-



















where ΔZ =1+σ−1(ακ + γ) − ρZ[1 + σ−1(κ + βγ)+β(1− ρZ)],Z= S,D.
More-active monetary policy (higher α) reduces the elasticities of inﬂation and
output to demand shocks. Supply shocks, however, present the monetary authority
with a well-known tradeoﬀ: a more-active policy stance reduces the elasticity of
inﬂation with respect to supply shocks, but it raises the responsiveness of output. A
stronger reaction of monetary policy to output (higher γ) reduces the elasticities of
inﬂation and output to demand shocks. Higher γ reduces the elasticity of output to
supply shocks and raises the responsiveness of inﬂation to supply shocks.
3.3. The Long-Run Taylor Principle. Turning back to the setup with regime
change, this section describes how to derive restrictions on the monetary policy pro-
cess that ensure the long-run Taylor principle is satisﬁed. Substituting the policy
rule, (29), into (25) yields
xt = Etxt+1 − σ
−1(α(st)πt + γ(st)xt − Etπt+1)+u
D
t . (32)
The system to be solved consists of (26) and (32).
To specify the system whose eigenvalues determine whether there exists a unique
bounded equilibrium, we follow the procedure for the Fisherian model. Let πit =
πt(st = i,uD
t uS
t )a n dxit = xt(st = i,uD
t ,u S
t ),i=1 ,2, denote state-speciﬁc inﬂation
and output. As appendix B describes, after deﬁning the forecast errors
η
π
1t+1 = π1t+1 − Etπ1t+1,η
π
2t+1 = π2t+1 − Etπ2t+1, (33)
η
x
1t+1 = x1t+1 − Etx1t+1,η
x
2t+1 = x2t+1 − Etx2t+1, (34)
the model is cast in the form






































and the matrices are deﬁned in the appendix. A straightforward extension of propo-
sition 1 (and its proof in appendix A) applies to this model: necessary and suﬃcientGENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 15
conditions for the existence of a unique bounded solution to (35) is that all the gen-
eralized eigenvalues of (B,A) lie outside the unit circle. The eigenvectors associated
with those eigenvalues generate four linear restrictions that determine the regime-
dependent forecast errors for inﬂation and output. The eigenvalues of this system
determine whether the monetary policy process satisﬁes the long-run Taylor princi-
ple. The model structure is such that analytical expressions for the eigenvalues are
available, but they do not yield compact expressions.
Figure 2 illustrates that recurring regime change can dramatically expand the set
of policy parameters that deliver a determinate equilibrium.
11 As long as one regime
is active, the less persistent the other regime is, the smaller is the lower bound on the
response of monetary policy to inﬂation. The bottom panels of the ﬁgure indicate
that when regimes are transitory, a large negative response of policy to inﬂation is
consistent with determinacy.
12 As in the Fisherian model, a determinate equilibrium
can be produced by a policy process that is mildly passive most of the time or very
passive some of the time.
In contrast to ﬁxed regimes, recurring regime change makes determinacy of equilib-
rium depend on the policy process and all the parameters describing private behavior,
(β,σ,κ), even when the Taylor rule does not respond to output. Because the cur-
rent regime is not expected to prevail forever, parameters that aﬀect intertemporal
margins interact with expected policies to inﬂuence determinacy [ﬁgure 3]. Greater
willingness of households to substitute intertemporally (lower σ) or greater ability
of ﬁrms to adjust prices (lower ω) enhance substitution away from expected inﬂa-
tion, giving expected regime change a smaller role in decisions. This shrinks the
determinacy region toward the ﬂexible-price region in section 2.







The method of undetermined coeﬃcients delivers solutions as functions of this small-




















1 for st =1
aZ




1 for st =1
bZ
2 for st =2 ,Z = D,S. (39)
11For simplicity, ﬁgures 2 and 3 are drawn setting γ(st)=0 ,s t =1 ,2, so in ﬁxed regimes, the
Taylor principle is α1 > 1a n dα2 > 1.
12 In the Fisherian model we restricted attention to cases where αi > 0f o ri =1 ,2. This
restriction focuses on policies of economic interest, though as these results indicate, it is not a
necessary condition for determinacy in the new Keynesian model.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 16
These posited solutions, along with their one-step-ahead expectations,


















































for i,j =1 ,2, are substituted into (26) and (32) to form a system whose solution
yields expressions for π and x as functions of the model parameters and the monetary
policy process. Appendix B describes the systems of equations that are solved.
4. Some Practical Implications of Regime Switching
We turn now to the implications of monetary policy processes that empirical ev-
idence suggests are relevant. In practice, obeying the Taylor principle is viewed as
desirable because of its well-known stabilization properties and its ability to prevent
ﬂuctuations due to self-fulﬁlling expectations. However, no central bank systemati-
cally implements a policy with the primary goal of satisfying the Taylor principle on
a period-by-period basis. Instead, central banks seem to have internalized Taylor’s
key prescription: on average, raise nominal interest rates more than one-for-one with
inﬂation. But central banks also desire the ﬂexibility to respond to developments
that may entail a departure from the Taylor principle. Should such departures be
of concern? Addressing this question requires a complete speciﬁcation of the mone-
tary policy process—the degree of the departure, given by regime-dependent values
of the policy rule coeﬃcients, and the duration of the departure, determined by the
transition probabilities.
Two types of departures from the Taylor principle are of particular interest in
describing Federal Reserve behavior. The ﬁrst arises when private agents believe there
is a small probability of returning to a persistent regime like the one that prevailed in
the 1970s. This policy process reﬂects empirical work that ﬁnds U.S. monetary policy
followed very diﬀerent rules from 1960 to 1979 and after 1982. The second kind of
departure occurs when central banks abandon their “business-as-usual” rule and do
something diﬀerent for brief periods of time. Examples include the October 1987 stock
market crash, Asian and Russian ﬁnancial crises in the 1990s, credit controls in 1980,
sluggish job-market recoveries from recessions, and currency crises. These are events
with small probability mass that recur and can entail a substantial deviation from
the usual rule. We model these events as relatively short-lived excursions into passive
policy behavior, though we recognize that this is, at best, a crude representation of
the diversity of examples listed above.
Departures from a constant rule obeying the Taylor principle have two possible
ramiﬁcations. The ﬁrst is determinacy of equilibrium and the second is volatility
arising from expectation formation eﬀects. We examine these ramiﬁcations for the
two types of departures from the Taylor principle.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 17
4.1. A Return to the 1970s? Many observers of U.S. monetary policy fear that
the Fed could revert to the policies of the 1970s. Such a fear is often behind argu-
ments for adopting inﬂation targeting in the United States [Bernanke and Mishkin
(1997), Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999a), Mishkin (2004), Goodfriend
(2005)]. The United States seems particularly susceptible to this kind of policy rever-
sal because, in the absence of institutional reforms, the Fed relies on what Bernanke,
Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999b) call the “just trust us” approach, which relies
more on the personal credibility of policy makers than on the credibility of the policy
institution or the policymaking process.
13
Three widely cited empirical studies report constant-coeﬃcient estimates of Tay-
lor rules for the United States [Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Taylor (1999a),
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)]. Each of these reports that U.S. monetary policy
was passive through the 1960s and 1970s and active since 1982. Eﬀorts to estimate
Markov-switching versions of these rules frequently ﬁnd analogous results [Favero and
Monacelli (2005), Davig and Leeper (2006b)]. A literal interpretation of the switching
results is that agents place substantial probability mass on a return to the inﬂationary
times of the 1970s.
4.1.1. Determinacy Regions for Previous Studies. Previous studies posit that U.S.
monetary policy unexpectedly shifted from a rule that allowed a large multiplicity
of equilibria to one that delivered a determinate equilibrium. For example, Lubik
and Schorfheide (2004) emphasize that in a model with a ﬁxed policy rule, their
estimate of Fed behavior from 1960-1979 leaves the equilibrium indeterminate and
subject to self-fulﬁlling sunspot equilibria.14 Since the early 1980s, however, Lubik
and Schorfheide infer that their estimates imply a determinate equilibrium. In the
latter period, for the mean of the posterior distribution they estimate α1 =2 .19
and γ1 = .3, while for the earlier period the estimates are α2 = .89 and γ2 = .15.
Their maximum likelihood estimates contrast the ﬁt of determinate to indeterminate
equilibria under the maintained assumption that policy rules cannot change.
Central to Lubik and Schorheide’s study is the logical inconsistency that Cooley,
LeRoy, and Raymon (1982, 1984) observed about rational expectations policy exper-
iments: although policy rules can and do change, agents in the model always believe
13Fiscal policy in the United States represents a possible impetus for a change from an active to
a passive monetary policy stance. As ﬁscal pressures build, it may be reasonable to expect some
erosion of the much-vaunted independence of the Federal Reserve. A possible outcome is a shift
to a policy that accommodates inﬂation as a source of ﬁscal ﬁnancing. Sargent’s (1999) learning
environment oﬀers a diﬀerent rationale for how a return to the 1970s might arise. In his setup, time
inconsistency and constant-gain learning combine to create incentives for policy to optimally choose
to revert to an accommodative stance.
14Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) also suggest this possibility.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 18
such changes are impossible. Do Lubik and Schorfheide’s inferences about determi-
nacy of equilibrium stand up in an environment in which agents’ expectations reﬂect
the possibility that policy regime can change? An answer requires specifying values
for β,κ,a n dσ, as well as the transition probabilities. Lubik and Schorfheide do not
constrain the estimates of private parameters to be the same across regimes, so there
is no straightforward method to choose single values for those parameters. Instead,
we compare two sets of parameter values for κ and σ, which draw extreme values
for κ and σ from Lubik and Schorfheide’s estimated 90-percent probability intervals.
The ﬁrst set shrinks the region of determinacy in (p11,p 22)-space and the second set
expands it. We assume β = .99. Shaded regiones in ﬁgure 4 report combinations of
the transition probabilities, (p11,p 22), that yield a determinate equilibrium.15
The ﬁgure appears to lend support to Lubik and Schorfheide’s inference that in-
ﬂation in the 1970s may have been driven by sunspots. After all, if the passive
regime has an expected duration of more than 5 years (p22 >. 95), then Lubik and
Schorfheide’s policy parameter estimates imply indeterminacy.
Carrying this argument forward, however, reveals an unappealing implication. Un-
less one is willing to maintain the implausible assumption that the post-1982 regime
is an absorbing state (p11 =1 ) , the U.S. economy must still be in an indeterminate
equilibrium.16 Without assuming people place no probability mass on future passive
policy, it is diﬃcult to reconcile Lubik and Schorfheide’s conclusion that the equilib-
rium switched from indeterminate to determinate with an environment of recurring
regime change.
Alternatively, if the passive regime has an expected duration of less than 5 years,
then a suﬃcientlypersistent active regime yields a determinate equilibrium. The logic
then implies that the 1970s ﬂuctuations were not driven by sunspots; rather, they are
the outcome of a determinate equilibrium with shocks whose impacts are ampliﬁed
by passive monetary policy behavior.
Table 1 reports the volatility of inﬂation and output, conditional on exogenous
shocks, in each regime relative to a ﬁxed regime with active policy. The results use
Lubik and Schorfheide’s estimated policy parameters and the baseline calibration.
Regimes are equally likely with expected duration of 5 years. Expectations formation
eﬀects are substantial, raising the relative inﬂation volatility from 9 to 15 percent,
even when the prevailing regime is active.
Of more importance for assessing Lubik and Schorfheide’s inferences, in the passive
regime inﬂation is about 2
1
2 times more volatile than in the active regime. The change
in output volatility is also substantial and depends on the source of disturbance,
15The smaller region uses σ =1 .04 and κ =1 .07; the larger region uses σ =2 .84 and κ =0 .27.
16The reasoning is identical to that contained in footnote 8. Once the economy transits to the
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rising for demand shocks and falling for supply shocks. Lubik and Schorfheide ﬁnd
that sunspot shocks help to account for the macroeconomic instability of the 1970s.
This example suggests that indeterminacy may not be necessary to account for the
observed shift in volatility in the post-war period.
Of course, determinacy of equilibrium depends on all the parameters of the model,
so the 5-year duration for the passive monetary regime, which the ﬁgure suggests, is
sensitive to the parameter settings. For example, when α2 increases to .95, a value well
inside Lubik and Schorfheide’s 90-percent probability interval, determinacy requires
the expected duration of the passive regime to be about 10 years, a highly plausible
value. Modest changes in other parameters can also have substantial impacts on the
determinacy regions. A satisfactory resolution to the question of whether aggregate
ﬂuctuations in the U.S. are driven by sunspots or are the outcome of a determinate
equilibrium subject to various shocks requires estimation of a complete DSGE model
with a switching monetary policy process.
A central bank that seeks to stabilizeinﬂation and output should be concerned with
the private sector’s beliefs about possible future policy regimes. The possibility of
prolonged episodes of passive policy introduces the potential for destabilizing sunspot
ﬂuctuations. Even if beliefs about alternative regimes do not create indeterminacy,
the expectations formation eﬀects can make it more diﬃcult for monetary policy to
achieve its goals, even when current policy is active. The next section illustrates
that even very brief recurring regimes of passive policy can generate expectations
formation eﬀects that contribute importantly to aggregate volatility.
4.2. Financial Crises and Business Cycles. Periodically, monetary policy shifts
its focus from price stability to other concerns. Two other concerns that recurrently
come into the central bank’s focus are ﬁnancial stability and job creation. Episodes
in which price stability is de-emphasized in favor of other objectives can last a few
months or more than a year. Distinctive features of these episodes are that they recur
fairly often and that they represent an important shift away from monetary policy’s
usual reaction to inﬂation and output. In the United States, since Greenspan became
chairman of the Fed in the summer of 1987, the episodes include at least two stock
market crashes, two foreign ﬁnancial crises, and two “jobless recoveries”—an episode
every three years, on average.17
Marshall (2001) carefully documents the ﬁnancial crisis in late summer and fall
of 1998. In August the Russian government devalued the rouble, defaulted on debt,
and suspended payments by ﬁnancial institutions to foreign creditors. These actions
17We do not include the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in this list because, although the
Fed reacted sharply by pumping liquidity into the market and lowering the federal funds rate, within
two months it had just as sharply withdrawn the liquidity. This event is probably best modeled as
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precipitated the near collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, a large hedge fund.
The Fed reacted swiftly by cutting the federal funds rate by a total of 75 basis
points over three moves. One of the policy moves arose from an unusual intermeeting
conference call on October 15 and all the moves occurred against a backdrop of
concern by Federal Open Market Committee members about inﬂation. In fact, until
the August 18 FOMC meeting, which left the funds rate unchanged, the Committee
concluded the risks to the outlook were tilted toward rising inﬂation. Marshall argues
that the Fed’s unusually rapid response signalled that the “policy rule had changed,”
with the purpose of discretely shifting private-sector beliefs to a lower likelihood of a
liquidity crisis in the United States.
Rabanal (2004) presents a variety of evidence on time variation in Taylor rules.
First, he reports estimates of Taylor rules with parameter drift that buttress Mar-
shall’s claim: during periods that Rabanal calls “high risk in the economy,” the Fed’s
response to inﬂation declines appreciably. High-risk periods include ﬁnancial crises.
Rabanal also estimates a two-state—recessions and expansions—Taylor rule to ﬁnd
that during recessions the Fed’s reaction to inﬂation is weaker and its reaction to out-
put is stronger than during expansions. Davig and Leeper’s (2006b) estimates of (29)
identify the “jobless recoveries” from the recessions of 1990-91 and 2000 as episodes
of passive Fed behavior, with a weaker response to inﬂation and a stronger response
to output than in the surrounding active episodes. Whereas Rabanal estimates the
economy is three times more likely to be in an expansion than a recession, Davig and
Leeper, using a longer time series beginning in the late 1940s, estimate that active
and passive regimes are almost equally likely.
Table 2 reports that expectations formation eﬀects from a passive regime can sub-
stantially raise the standard deviations of inﬂation and output in an active regime
relative to their values in a ﬁxed regime. The probabilities of transitioning to the
passive regime are 5 percent and 2.5 percent (p11 = .95 and p11 = .975), which cor-
respond to a ﬁnancial crisis or stronger concern about job growth occurring every
5 or 10 years, on average. In the active and the ﬁxed regimes, α1 = α =1 .5a n d
γ1 = γ = .25. Passive policy responds more strongly to output (γ2 = .5), while
both its response to inﬂation, α2, and its persistence, p22, take diﬀerent values in the
table.18
When the passive regime lasts only one period (p22 =0 ) , expectations formation
eﬀects are relatively small and intuition from ﬁxed regimes directly applies: when
regime 2 is more passive (lower α2), expectations formation eﬀects raise the volatil-
ity of inﬂation and output from demand shocks, raise the volatility of inﬂation from
supply shocks, and lower the volatility of output from supply shocks. Fixed-regime
18In the case of strict inﬂation targeting, γ1 = γ2 = γ =0 , the relative standard deviations of
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intuition carries over because when the passive regime lasts only one period, it gen-
erates only minor expectations formation eﬀects.
As the passive regime becomes more persistent (p22 rises), the monetary policy
process becomes less active and the relative volatility of inﬂation rises monotonically
across both types of shocks. Even when the expected duration of passive policy is
only 2 quarters (p22 = .5), as it might be during some ﬁnancial crises, if policy is
very passive, inﬂation volatility can be 20 percent or more higher in the active state
than in a ﬁxed-regime setup. When the duration is one year (p22 = .75), as when
the Fed kept interest rates low for extended periods during the two recent recoveries
from recession, inﬂation can be 50 percent more volatile than in a ﬁxed regime [see
columns for p11 = .95].
Persistence in the passive regime changes the eﬀects on relative output variability
of increases in the degree to which policy is passive. The prospect of moving to
a passive regime raises current and expected inﬂation in the active regime relative
to a ﬁxed regime. Although it starts at a higher level, in the long run the ergodic
mean of inﬂation in the switching environment converges to the mean when regime is
constant. With inﬂation expected to fall more rapidly in the active regime, the real
interest rate rises more sharply. A higher real rate oﬀsets the eﬀects of a demand
shock on output, but it reinforces the impacts of a supply shock. This shows up
in table 2 as declining relative output variability in the demand columns and rising
relative output variability in the supply columns, as the monetary policy process
becomes more passive.
The table shows that plausible departures from the Taylor principle during episodes
when the central bank’s focus shifts from inﬂation stabilization to other concerns,
can produce quantitatively important expectations formation eﬀects that can make it
more diﬃcult for the central bank to achieveits stabilization objectives during normal
periods.
5. Some Empirical Implications of Regime Change
Regime change also carries implications for empirical work on monetary policy.
This section illustrates two pitfalls in interpreting time series generated by switching
policies with theoretical models in which policy rules are time invariant.
5.1. Qualitative Inferences from Estimated Policy Rules. It is commonplace
for empirical studies of monetary policy to split data samples into subperiods over
which researchers believe a particular policy regime prevailed. This section illustrates
the pitfalls of this procedure when actual time series are generated by recurring regime
change. We imagine that a researcher has access to a long time series of data and
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new Keynesian model with a ﬁxed policy regime. The researcher has extra-sample
information that speciﬁes when regime changes occurred. We assume this information
is accurate, as are the equations describing private behavior.
We use the model with the baseline calibration of private parameters—β = .99,σ=
1,κ = .17—and the estimates of policy behavior and exogenous shocks that Lubik
and Schorfheide (2004) report to generate a sample of data on {xt,π t,i t} of length
10,000 from the regime-switching new Keynesian model. We consider three scenarios:
conditional on being in regime 1 (active monetary policy with α1 =2 .19 and γ1 =
0.30); conditional on being in regime 2 (passive monetary policy with α2 =0 .89 and
γ2 =0 .15); recurring changes in policy regime between regime 1 and regime 2. Using
these simulateddata, the researcherestimates a VARwith a common set of identifying
assumptions across samples: monetary policy aﬀects aggregate demand directly, while
its contemporaneous eﬀects on aggregate supply operate through output via a Phillips
curve.19 With these restrictions, the model is just identiﬁed when the response of
monetary policy to output, γi, is calibrated at its true value. No restrictions are
imposed on lags in any equation. The estimated model is summarized by
xt = δit + u
D
t + lags
πt = θxt + u
S
t + lags (42)
it = απt +¯ γxt + u
MP
t + lags
where ¯ γ denotes the parameter that is ﬁxed at its true value and the serially correlated
shock, uMP
t , has been added to the policy rule.20
Table 3 reports that the VAR accurately estimates the policy parameters in each
of the three scenarios, with the estimated values of the response of monetary policy
to inﬂation remarkably close to their theoretical values. Researchers who import
the policy estimates into a new Keynesian model with a calibration of the discount
factor, β, of about 0.99 will conclude that regime 1 yields a determinate equilibrium,
regime 2 leaves the equilibrium indeterminate, and the full sample is consistent with
a determinate equilibrium.
21
In the simulated regime-switching model the equilibrium is determinate, so the
qualitative inference drawn about regime 2 is incorrect. Using the full sample yields
qualitatively accurate inferences because it brings information from both regimes to
19These restrictions accurately represent the direct contemporaneous interactions among variables
in the new Keynesian model, but they do not necessarily reﬂect all the contemporaneous interactions
that operate through expectations.
20The shock processes are calibrated to be roughly consistent with Lubik and Schorfheide’s (2004)
estimates: standard deviations are σD =0 .23,σ S =0 .80,σ MP =0 .20 and the autoregressive param-
eters are ρj =0 .75,j= D,S,MP.
21Woodford (2003, Appendix C) proves that the equilibrium of this model is determinate if and
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bear, producing more accurate estimates of policy behavior in the long run. Splitting
the sample into distinct regimes, in contrast, can distort inferences: conditioning on
regime 2, for example, discards all observations in which policy behaved actively,
thereby uniquely determining the equilibrium.
5.2. Quantitative Predictions of the Impacts of Shocks. To illustrate the
potential expectations formation eﬀects from a belief that policy might return to
its passive behavior in the 1970s, we employ the baseline calibration with Lubik
and Schorfheide’s policy parameter estimates, along with the transition probabilities
p11 = .95 and p22 = .93, which deliver a determinate equilibrium. These probabilities
mean there is a 5 percent chance of returning to a passive policy rule. The active
regime is expected to last 20 quarters, while the passive regime lasts 14 quarters, on
average. We gauge the extent that expectations of a future passive regime aﬀects the
equilibrium in the active regime by contrasting responses of inﬂation and output to
demand and supply disturbances in the active regime with switching to those in an
equivalently active ﬁxed regime.
Expectations formation eﬀects from this policy process are substantial. Figure 5
shows that researchers predicting the impacts of exogenous disturbances assuming
the policy rule is ﬁxed will consistently underpredict inﬂation.22 The underprediction
can be more than 20 basis points following demand shocks and nearly 1 percentage
point following supply disturbances. Output predictions depend on the source of the
shock. A hump-shaped response of output in the switching environment means the
ﬁxed-regime model initially overpredicts and then underpredicts output. With supply
shocks, the prediction errors are quite large. A constant-coeﬃcient policy rule misses
the initial decline in output by nearly 1 percentage point; the errors change sign after
several periods when constant-coeﬃcient predictions are about .3 percentage points
too pessimistic.
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper oﬀers a broader perspective on the Taylor principle and the range of
unique bounded equilibria it supports by allowing policy regime to vary over time.
Examples show that endowing conventional models with empirically relevant mone-
tary policy switching processes can generate important expectations formation eﬀects.
These eﬀects can alter the qualitative and quantitative predictions of standard mod-
els. Along the way, the paper develops a two-step solution method that obtains
determinacy conditions and solutions for a rational expectations equilibrium. This
22These are expected paths, computed taking draws from regime after the initial period.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 24
method can be applied to a broad class of purely forward-looking rational expec-
tations models with exogenous Markov switching in parameters and many discrete
regimes.
The paper’s results should be useful for both researchers and policy analysts using
constant-coeﬃcient policy rules in DSGE models. The choice of how to model devia-
tions from such rules is potentially quite important. Under prevailing practice, that
choice is made implicitly. That choice should be explicit, with careful consideration
given to the characteristics of the deviation—how likely is it to recur? how long is it
likely to last? what is the nature of policy behavior during the period of deviation?
Some deviations are more naturally modeled as additive, exogenous errors to the
policy rule. Some might be better modeled as systematic responses to an expanded
information set for the policy authority. Others are best treated as recurring changes
in rules mapping endogenous variables to policy choices, as in this paper.
Modeling policy as we do in this paper requires no more heroic assumptions than
those routinely made in policy research. Largely as a matter of convenience, nearly
all theoretical models assume—rather heroically—that future policy is current pol-
icy. When the current regime is an absorbing state, this assumption is reasonable.
If, as seems more likely, alternative future policies are possible, then rational agents
must have a probability distribution over those policies, and the properties of ob-
served equilibria will depend critically agents’ beliefs about those policies and their
probabilities.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 25
Appendix A. Proof of Determinacy in Fisherian Model
Following the notation in section 2.1, πt(zt)=( π1t,π 2t)
  denotes the MSV solution,
while   πt =(   π1t,  π2t)
  denotes any other solution to (11). The associated systems, for
i =1 ,2, are
αiπit = pi1Etπ1t+1 + pi2Etπ2t+1 + rt (43)
and
αi  πit = pi1Et  π1t+1 + pi2Et  π2t+1 + rt. (44)
Let xit ≡   πit − πit be the diﬀerence between any other solution and the MSV
solution. Subtracting (43) from (44) yields
αixit = pi1Etx1t+1 + pi2Etx2t+1, (45)
the system of interest for the present analysis. Bounded solutions for inﬂation corre-















and letting xt =( x1t,x 2t) , write (45) as
xt = MEtxt+1. (47)
To establish determinacy, we must show that E[xt+1 |Ωt]=0s ot h a t ,g i v e nαi > 0
for i =1 ,2,x it =0 . This establishes that πit = πt(zt)f o ri =1 ,2, and the MSV
solution is the unique bounded solution to the original system in (11).





















Note that the roots λ1 and λ2 are necessarily real, that λ1 > 0, and that λ1 >λ 2.
Proposition 1. When αi > 0,f o ri =1 ,2, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
determinacy of equilibrium, deﬁned as the existence of a unique bounded solution for
{xt} in (47), is that all the eigenvalues of M l i ei n s i d et h eu n i tc i r c l e .
Proof. (Suﬃciency) Suppose there exists a vector of bounds K =( K(1),K(2))
 ,
where K(i) ≥ 0f o ri =1 ,2 such that whenever st = i, |xit|≤K(i). Then there exist
bounds K (i) ≥ 0w h e r e|xit|≤K (i) for all i and K (i) is deﬁned by
K
 (i)=m a x
xit
   α
−1
i [pi1x1t + pi2x2t]
    s.t. |xit|≤K(i)f o r i =1 ,2. (50)GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 26
The solution to this maximization problem is to set each xit equal to its upper bound,
xit = K(i), so the vector of bounds evolves according to
K
  = MK. (51)
Repeating this argument, existence of the vector of bounds K  implies existence of a
vector of bounds
K
   = MK
  = M
2K. (52)
Continuing with this line of argument, it follows that if the vector of bounds K exists,
then MnK is also a vector of bounds, for any n. If all the eigenvalues of M lie inside
the unit circle, then limn→∞ Mn = 0 and the only bounded solution to (47) is xt =0 ,
for all t.
(Necessity) Suppose, by way of contradiction, that one eigenvalue does not lie inside
the unit circle; say λ1 ≥ 1, while λ2 < 1. We now show that under these conditions
there exist a continuum of solutions to (47). Diagonalize M by writing M = V ΛV −1,
































where γ is an arbitrary constant associated with the loose initial condition. In terms















where (v11,v 21)  is the ﬁrst column of V, the matrix of right eigenvectors. The solution
in (56) shows that if one eigenvalue of M fails to lie inside the unit circle, then there
exist a continuum of solutions to (47), indexed by the arbitrary constant γ.
The indeterminate solution also supports bounded sunspot equilibria. Consider the
solution y1t+1 = λ
−1
1 y1t+φt+1, where φ is any random variable with bounded support
that satisﬁes Etφt+1 =0 . Evidently, this solution, together with y2t =0 , also satisﬁes
(54) and produces bounded ﬂuctuations in the underlying {xt} process. 
The proof of necessity of proposition 1 illustrates that, in general, indeterminacy
is a property that transmits across regimes. This occurs because, except in the case
when the current (state-contingent) determinate regime is an absorbing state, the
expectation of moving to the other (state-contingent) indeterminate regime makesGENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 27
the current regime indeterminate also. If, for example, p11 =1 , so regime 1 is an




Deﬁnition 1. The long-run Taylor principle (LRTP) is
(1 − α2)p11 +( 1− α1)p22 + α1α2 > 1. (57)
For given p11 and p22, the LRTP deﬁnes a hyperbola in (α1,α 2)−space with the
vertical asymptote where α1 = p11 and the horizontal asymptote where α2 = p22.A s
in ﬁgure 1, our analysis focuses on the hyperbola in the region of the parameter space
where αi >p ii,f o ri =1 ,2. This region captures the economically interesting set
of monetary policy processes and has the intuitive implication that αi > 1f o rs o m e
i =1 ,2 is a necessary condition for the LRTP to imply determinacy. For example,
αi < 0, for i =1 ,2, can satisfy the LRTP, but is at odds with the way central banks
set policy and does not result in all the eigenvalues of M being inside the unit circle,
so fails to deliver a unique bounded equilibrium.
Lemma 1. If αi >p ii for all i =1 ,2 and LRTP, then αi > 1 for some i =1 ,2.
Proof. For pii =1f o rs o m ei,t h e nαi > 1f o rs o m ei =1 ,2 by the condition αi >p ii
for all i =1 ,2. For pii < 1f o rb o t hi,t a k eα2 >p 22 ≥ 0 and rewrite the LRTP as
α1 >
1 − p11 − p22 + α2p11
α2 − p22
. (58)
Note that the right side of (58), expressed as a function of α2 and the transition
probabilities, is monotonically decreasing in α2. We now show that over the range





Letting α2 → p22 implies the right side of (58) approaches ∞ for any p11 ∈ [0,1) and
p22 ∈ [0,1). 
Proposition 2. Given αi >p ii for i =1 ,2, the following statements are equivalent:
(A) All the eigenvalues of M lie inside the unit circle.
(B) αi > 1, for some i =1 ,2, and the long-run Taylor principle (LRTP) is satis-
ﬁed.
Proof. (Statement A implies statement B)
We know λ1 > 0, so the restriction on that root is 0 <λ 1 < 1. Hence we seek the
implications for (α1,α 2,p 11,p 22) of the conditions that λ1 > 0a n dλ1 < 1. Considering
each case,GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 28
λ1 > 0 : This is true by inspection and imposes no additional restrictions on the
policy process.
λ1 < 1 : This condition implies
 
(α2p11 − α1p22)
2 +4 α1α2p12p21 < 2α1α2 − (α2p11 + α1p22). (60)
The restriction that −1 <λ 2 < 1, written as λ2 > −1a n dλ2 < 1, carries further im-
plications for the policy process that delivers a determinate equilibrium. Considering
each case,




2 +4 α1α2p12p21 < 2α1α2 − (α2p11 + α1p22). (61)
λ2 > −1 : This condition implies
2α1α2 +( α2p11 + α1p22) >
 
(α2p11 − α1p22)
2 +4 α1α2p12p21. (62)
Squaring both sides and simplifying yields
α1α2 + p11(1 + α2)+p22(1 + α1) > 1 (63)
Note that (60) and (61) together imply that
 
 






    < 2α1α2 − (α2p11 + α1p22), (64)
so it must be the case that 2α1α2 − (α2p11 + α1p22) > 0 and squaring both sides of
(60) preserves the inequality. Doing this and rearranging yields the LRTP
α1α2 + p11(1 − α2)+p22(1 − α1) > 1. (65)
Since, as shown above, when λ1 < 1,
 
(α2p11 − α1p22)





2 +4 α1α2p12p21 <
 
(α2p11 − α1p22)
2 +4 α1α2p12p21, (67)
(61) also yields the LRTP
α1α2 + p11(1 − α2)+p22(1 − α1) > 1. (68)
It is straightforward to show that condition (68) implies condition (63). To see this,
rewrite the conditions as
α1α2 + p11 + p22 > 1+α2p11 + α1p22 (69)
α1α2 + p11 + p22 > 1 − α2p11 − α1p22 (70)GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 29
By the non-negativity of (α1,α 2,p 11,p 22), it is clear that if (69) holds, then (70) also
holds. Given αi >p ii for i =1 ,2 and LRTP, Lemma 1 implies that αi > 1, for some
i =1 ,2.
(Statement B implies statement A)










1 − p11 − p22
α1α2
, (71)
and note the eigenvalues satisfy







since αi >p ii for i =1 ,2a n d
λ1λ2 =
p11 + p22 − 1
α1α2
. (73)
Substituting (72) and (73) into (71), yields
λ1 + λ2 − 1 <λ 1λ2. (74)
Now (74) implies that λ1  =1a n dλ2  = 1 because under the maintained assumption
of the LRTP, equality of the roots to unity implies the obvious contradiction that
λi <λ i.
Since λ1 > 0, (74) is
1 − 1/λ1 <λ 2(1 − 1/λ1), (75)
and (75) implies if 0 <λ 1 < 1t h e nλ2 < 1o ri fλ1 > 1t h e nλ2 > 1. Thus, (75) states
that both eigenvalues are either outside or inside the unit circle.
Now using the assumption that αi >p ii for i =1 ,2, expression (72) becomes







imposing a restriction on λ2.W en o wh a v et h a t
0 <λ 1 < 1a n d|λ2| < 1 (77)
because the alternative of λ1 > 1a n dλ2 > 1 violates (76). Clearly, if 0 <λ 1 < 1a n d
λ2 ≤− 1, then (76) is violated, leading to |λ2| < 1. 
Uniqueness of the bounded solution, which is established by proposition 1, need
not imply there is a unique stationary solution, as Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2006)
show. Those authors require a solution to be mean square stable, ensuring the exis-
tence of ﬁnite ﬁrst and second moments, and argue that the long-run Taylor principle
admits a continuum of solutions, including sunspots. Their solution, which allows
lagged states to enter, is not bounded, as it can exceed any ﬁnite bound with positiveGENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 30
probability.23 This implication of stationarity makes their solution at odds with the
standard deﬁnition of determinacy applied to linear rational expectations models.
Boundeness precludes lagged states from entering the solution.
Appendix B. Determinacy and Solution for the New Keynesian Model
The proof of determinacy and the solution method described in appendix A can be
applied directlyto any purely forward-looking linear model to show that the minimum
state variable solution is the unique bounded solution. The equations of the model
are
πt = βEtπt+1 + κxt + u
S
t , (78)
xt = Etxt+1 − σ
−1(α(st)πt + γ(st)xt − Etπt+1)+u
D
t . (79)
The state-contingent expectations are
Etπt+1 = E[πt+1
 












   st = i,Ω
−s
t ]=pi1E[x1t+1
   Ω
−s
t ]+pi2E[x2t+1
   Ω
−s
t ]. (81)
The model can be rewritten as
πit = β (pi1Etπ1t+1 + pi2Etπ2t+1)+κxit + u
S
t , (82)
xit = pi1Etx1t+1 + pi2Etx2t+1 − (83)
σ
−1 ((αiπit + γixit) − (pi1Etπ1t+1 + pi2Etπ2t+1)) + u
D
t , (84)







t−1,...s t−1,s t−2,...} denotes the agents’
information set at t, not including the current regime, and Ωt =Ω
−s
t ∪{ st}. All ex-




1t+1 = π1t+1 − Etπ1t+1,η
π
2t+1 = π2t+1 − Etπ2t+1, (85)
η
x
1t+1 = x1t+1 − Etx1t+1,η
x
2t+1 = x2t+1 − Etx2t+1. (86)
and use them to eliminate the conditional expectations in (82)-(83), yielding the
system
AYt = BYt−1 + Aηt + Cut, (87)
23One aspect of Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha’s indeterminate solution includes xt+1 = α2
p22xt +
shocks. |α2/p22| > 1 is ruled out by boundedness, while |α2/p22| < 1 produces a multiplicity of















































































The roots of the system are the generalized eigenvalues of (B,A), where a unique,
bounded equilibrium requires all four eigenvalues to lie inside the unit circle. Obtain-
ing analytical restrictions on the roots that deliver determinacy are more complicated
in the new Keynesian model because, as was highlighted in the text, the determinacy
regions vary with private sector parameters. To establish determinacy, note that the
model can be written so current state-contingent variables depend only on the ex-
pectations of future state-contingent variables, as in (11). Writing the model in this
form highlights that the model has the same structure as the simple Fisherian model.
Solutions for the model are derived using the method of undetermined coeﬃcients.
However, given that the expectational errors in (87) are conditionally mean zero,
standard methods for solving linear rational expectations models can be used to
compute the solution. For example, Sims’s (2001) method and corresponding gensys
code produces a solution matching the method of undetermined coeﬃcients solution.
McCallum (2004) notes that in purely forward looking models, such as (87), the
method of undetermined coeﬃcients using the minimum set of state variables yields
the unique, bounded solution.
In obtaining the solution, we assume supply and demand shocks are uncorrelated,
so the coeﬃcients on the demand shocks and those on the supply shocks can be solved





1 − βp11ρS −βρS (1 − p11) −κ 0
−βρS (1 − p22)1 − βp22ρS 0 −κ
1
σ(α1 − ρSp11) −
ρS
σ (1 − p11)1 + σ−1γ1 − p11ρS −ρS (1 − p11)
−
ρS
σ (1 − p22)
1





































1 − βp11ρD −βρD (1 − p11) −κ 0
−βρD (1 − p22)1 − βp22ρD 0 −κ
1
σ (α1 − ρDp11) −
ρD
σ (1 − p11)1 + σ−1γ1 − ρDp11 −ρD (1 − p11)
−
ρD
σ (1 − p22)
1


































Analytical expressions for the coeﬃcients are not easy to interpret, but are straight-
forward to compute. These coeﬃcients are the impact elasticitiesof the various shocks
on output and inﬂation.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 33
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Demand Supply
Inﬂation Output Inﬂation Output
Active Regime 1.152 0.936 1.090 1.022
Passive Regime 2.650 1.980 2.866 0.359
Table 1. Standard deviation relative to ﬁxed active regime.
Uses Lubik and Schorfheide’s estimated policy parameters—α1 =
2.19,γ 1 = .30,α 2 = .89,γ 2 = .15—and baseline parameters—β =
.99,σ=1 ,κ= .17. Transition probabilities are p11 = p22 = .95. Fixed
active regime is α =2 .19,γ= .30.
p11 = .95 p11 = .975
Demand Supply Demand Supply
Inﬂation Output Inﬂation Output Inﬂation Output Inﬂation Output
p22 =0
α2 = .5 1.044 1.008 1.075 .995 1.022 1.004 1.037 .998
α2 = .25 1.060 1.011 1.092 .994 1.030 1.005 1.045 .997
α2 =0 1.073 1.014 1.110 .992 1.037 1.007 1.054 .997
p22 = .5
α2 = .5 1.084 .988 1.143 1.008 1.042 .993 1.071 1.004
α2 = .25 1.120 .983 1.185 1.010 1.059 .990 1.091 1.006
α2 =0 1.165 .977 1.238 1.013 1.080 .987 1.115 1.007
p22 =2 /3
α2 = .5 1.123 .961 1.209 1.025 1.061 .979 1.104 1.014
α2 = .25 1.188 .940 1.290 1.034 1.092 .968 1.142 1.018
α2 =0 1.283 .910 1.408 1.048 1.135 .953 1.194 1.025
p22 = .75
α2 = .5 1.162 .931 1.275 1.044 1.080 .963 1.137 1.024
α2 = .25 1.268 .886 1.412 1.066 1.129 .940 1.199 1.034
α2 =0 1.454 .807 1.653 1.104 1.210 .903 1.302 1.052
Table 2. Standard deviation in active regime 1 relative to
ﬁxed regime. A c t i v ea n dﬁ x e dr e g i m e ss e tα1 = α =1 .5a n dγ1 =
γ = .25. Passive regime sets γ2 = .5. Ergodic probability of active
regime ranges from .83 (p11 = .95,p 22 = .75) to .98 (p11 = .975,p 22 =0 ) .GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 38
α ¯ γ δ θ
Regime 1 2.182 0.30 -1.690 0.409
Regime 2 0.885 0.15 -0.750 1.675
Full Sample 1.375 0.225 -1.476 0.657
Table 3. Estimated parameters from an identiﬁed VAR in
(42) using simulated data from regime-switching new Keyne-
sian model. Regime 1 is conditional on remaining in regime with
α1 =2 .19; Regime 2 is conditional on remaining in regime with
α2 =0 .89; Full sample is recurring changes from regime 1 to regime
2. α is the estimated response of monetary policy to inﬂation; ¯ γ is the
policy response to output, held ﬁxed in estimation.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 39
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Figure 1. Determinacy regions: Fisherian model. Parameter
combinations in the light-shaded regions imply a unique equilibrium
in ﬁxed-regime model; combinations in dark-shaded plus light-shaded
regions imply a unique equilibrium in regime-switching model.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 40
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Figure 2. Determinacy regions: New Keynesian model. Pa-
rameter combinations in the light-shaded regions imply a unique equi-
librium in ﬁxed-regime model; combinations in dark-shaded plus light-
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Figure 3. Determinacy regions and private parameters: New
Keynesian model. Parameter combinations in the light-shaded re-
gions imply a unique equilibrium in ﬁxed-regime model; combinations
in dark-shaded plus light-shaded regions imply a unique equilibrium in
regime-switching model for various settings of ω and σ.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 42

















Figure 4. Determinacy regions for Lubik and Schorfheide’s
estimates. Shaded regions give (p11,p 22) combinations that yield a
determinate equilibrium. Dark region is for parameters implying high
degree of ﬂexibility and substitution (σ =1 .04,κ=1 .07); light region
plus dark region for a low degree of ﬂexibility and substitution (σ =
2.84,κ=0 .27); β = .99 in both regions. Using Lubik and Schorfheide’s
(2004) estimates: α1 =2 .19,γ 1 = .30,α 2 = .89,γ 2 = .15.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 43





























































Figure 5. Demand and supply shocks under Lubik and
Schorfheide’s estimates of policy parameters. Solid line is con-
ditional on active regime initially (α1 =2 .19,γ 1 = .30) when other
regime is passive (α2 = .89,γ 2 = .15). Transition probabilities are
p11 = .95,p 22 = .93. Dashed line is ﬁxed regime with α = α1,γ = γ1.
Figures plot the mean responses from 50,000 draws of regime, beginning
in the second period.